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STATEMENT OF THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an Appealfromthe Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County,
State of Utah. The Defendant- Appellant, Laura Miller was charged in a Criminal Information
with three counts of violations of the Utah Controlled Substances Act and this is a direct appeal
from afinalorder and verdict entered by a jury of guilty as to all three charges.
Jurisdiction for this appeal is based upon Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellant
Procedure which governs appeals of criminal cases and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW AND CITATION TO THE RECORD
ISSUE 1)

Did the District Court err in failing to strike the paragraphs containing

information from the confidential informant from the Affidavit in support of the search warrant
because of admitted errors, misstatements, and material omissions which require suppression of
evidence seized under the warrant under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether misstatements or omissions in the
affidavit in support of search warrant as to probable cause is mixed question of law and fact
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subject to de novo review. United States vs. Mc Ouisten 795 F.2d 858 (9th Cir 1986); and, State
vs, Lee. 863 P.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1993).
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL
COURT:

A Motion to Suppress was filed on October 1, 1993 and can be found in the record

at page ten of the record. A pretrial hearing was held on February 4, 19945 see pages 1 to 72 of
the transcript
ISSUE 2)

Did the Trial Court commit an error in denying the Motion to Suppress

because of the failure to support the hearsay assertions of the confidential informant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The question of whether misstatements or omission on the

affidavit in support of search warrant as to probable cause is mixed question of law and fact
subject to de novo review. United States vs. Mc Ouisten 795 F.2d 858 (9th Cir 1986). State vs.
Lee. 863 P.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1993).
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL
COURT:

A Motion to Suppress was filed on October 1, 1993 and can be found in the record

at page ten of the record. A pretrial hearing was held on February 4, 1994, see pages 1 to 72 of
the transcript.
ISSUE 3)

Should the court have granted the mistrial Motion based upon the

prosecutors possession during jury deliberations of a key exhibit?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue is an issue of law and no difference should be given to
the decision below.
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL
COURT: The Motion for New Trial, the discussion on the record and the ruling are found in
the transcript pages 232 to 238.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
1.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he

right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated....".
2.

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution:
Therightof the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

3.

Rule 17(k) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have
been received as evidence, except deposition; and each juror may
also take with him any notes of the testimony or other proceedings
taken by himself, but none taken by any other person.

4.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
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(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the
rights of a party.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case in which the Defendant/Appellant was charged in an Information
with Unlawfully Producing a Controlled Substances a Third Degree Felony on October 1, 1993,
in Count II with Possession of Controlled Substances a Class B Misdemeanor, and in Count HI
with Possession of Drug Paraphernalia a Class B Misdemeanor.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT
A Hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress was held on February 4, 1994,
preceding a trial on April 26, 1994, in Monticello, Utah. The case was tried by a jury and on
April 26, 1994, the jury found the Defendant, Laura Ruth Miller, guilty of Unlawfully Producing a
Controlled Substances and guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substances and guilty of
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The Court entered a Judgment and Order of Probation
sentencing the Defendant to probation on June 2, 1994.
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DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The District Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and the matter was set for
Jury Trial. After a one day jury trial, the Defendant-Appellant was found guilty on all three
Counts. Subsequent tofinaljudgment, this appeal was filed.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

1.

At the Motion to Suppress hearing held on February 2, 1994, William Pierce, a

Deputy of the San Juan County Sheriffs Department, testified that he was the affiant on a Search
Warrant which was executed on property located in San Juan County, State of Utah where one
live marijuana plant was found. (Transcript of February 4, 1994, hearing and April 26, 1994, Tr.
7.)
2.

Deputy Pierce indicated that his investigation commenced upon the receipt of

Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 which was a handwritten letterfroma person by the name of Hans
Guhr. (Tr. pg 8).
3.

The handwritten note which was received as Exhibit

1 which initiation the investigation is set forth in the Addendum as Exhibit 3.
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4.

The officer indicated that prior to obtaining the search warrant, he never met

personally with Hans Guhr and that all of his contacts were over the telephone on one or two
occasions. (Tr. pg 11).
5.

The deputy indicated that the person that wrote the letter had given his name but

that he listed the person as a confidential informant on the Affidavit in support of the warrant
because Mr. Guhr told the officer "he wanted to stay out it". (Tr. pg 14).
6.

In relation to the statement in the Affidavit the deputy indicated that he had known

Hans Guhr "for two years" and that he hadfirstmet Hans Guhr in January, 1993, only 9 to 10
months prior to the issuance of the Affidavit. (Tr. pg 18).
7.

Deputy Pierce indicated that in January, 1993 that he had hired Hans Guhr to work

as a caretaker and security guard and paid him in cash and not by check. (Tr. pg 18).
8.

The deputy indicated that when he hired Hans Guhr as a security guard that he did

not perform a background or security check on Mr. Guhr. (Tr. pg 21).
9.

Deputy Pierce indicated that he had testified at a prior Preliminary Hearing that

Hans Guhr gave him a Social Security Number. (Tr pg 22). Mr. Guhr stated that all he had was
a Canadian Social Security number which he gave to Mr. Pierce. (Tr. 119)
10.

Deputy Pierce indicated that Hans Guhr told him at sometime that he was a

Canadian citizen and that he later learned, prior to issuance of the warrant, that Mr. Guhr was a
Canadian citizen. (Tr. pg 27).
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11.

Deputy Pierce indicated that after the time that he had left the deputy's

employment at the Rio Alga Mine as a security guard, he came in contact with Mr. Hans Guhr in
relation to a driving under the influence investigation involving a fried of Mr. Guhr. (Tr. pg 28).
12.

Prior to the issuance of the Affidavit in this case, Deputy Pierce indicated that

Hans Guhr had never given him any prior information as a confidential informant in relation to any
prior investigation. (Tr.30).
13.

Exhibit Nine was received into evidence which is a publication from a local

newspaper indicating that the public being offered a reward for information in relation to
controlled substance cases (Tr. pg 32).
14.

Deputy Pierce indicated that prior to the execution of the warrant, he went to the

property which was subject to the search and contacted Laura Miller on two occasions. (Tr. pg
37). On one of those occasions, the Defendant identified herself as Laura Miller and the officer
thought that this was the person that he was investigating in the letter. (Tr. 39). At the time of
that meeting, Laura Miller told the officer about problems she had at the property with the former
resident, Hans Guhr.(Tr. 40)
15.

At the time of the affidavit of the warrant, the deputy knew that his informant had

lived at the trailer in the summer just several weeks prior to the letter. (Tr. 41) Laura Miller
complained to the Deputy that Mr. Guhr left as caretaker and had not returned a pickup truck that
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belong to Steve Schultz, the owner of the property, and Laura Miller was living as a caretaker
because of problems with Mr. Guhr. (Tr. 41).
16.

Prior to signing the affidavit a resident of Monticello with a good reputation for

truth and honesty by the name of Mary Hutnick had told the Deputy that Mr. Guhr had caused her
to leave the Steve Schultz residence as a caretaker and she had told the deputy that Mr. Guhr was
a liar.(Tr 57) Also, Mary Hutnick had reported to the officer that Hans Guhr was looking in her
window and that she was concerned about this behavior by Mr. Guhr.(Tr. 59)
17.

Sherry Miller testified that Mr. Guhr stayed at her residence after he had left the

Steve Schultz property. She testified that Mr. Guhr usually drank Vodka in the morning for
breakfast and that he consumed alcohol on a daily basis. (Tr. 64) After Laura Miller was arrested,
she testified that Mr. Guhr was bragging in public and said MI got Laura. She's in jail" (Tr. 66).
18.

Sherry Miller also testified prior to the arrest of Laura Miller, that Hans Guhr had

told Sherry Miller that he was going to set her up. (Tr. 68)
19.

Mr. Guhr admitted that he was emotionally upset at Laura Miller when he turned

her in by means of the letter.(Tr. 113) He admitted that when hefirstsaw the marijuana that he
was also living on the property and he was daily watering a tree in the same area that the
marijuana plant was discovered. (Tr. 116 and 143) He admitted that he lived on the property
alone before Laura Miller came in June of 1993.(Tr. 147)
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20.

Mr. Guhr stated that he took the pictures of the marijuana plants while he was

living on the property so that he could "protect himself1fromLaura Miller "bad mouthing me"
(Tr. 128) He said that he released the photographs because Laura Miller made statements that
upset him.(Tr. 129)
21.

Concerning Exhibit One, the letter written by Mr. Guhr to the police, and the

allegation that Laura Miller was supposedly planting marijuana in the La Sal Mountains, the
witness stated that he had never saw Laura Miller give the plants to anyone. (Tr. 140)
22.

During closing argument, counsel for the Defendant made specific reference to

Statefs Exhibit One, the letter that Hans Guhr mailed to the San Juan Count Sheriffs Department.
The transcript indicates that counsel for the Defendant stated as follows:
[Mr. Gaither, Attorney for the Defendant]... And one of the keys, and Ifm going to go to that right
off, was he said, well, as far as the production charge is concerned, they didn't need Mr. Guhr,
that he just gave some information to the police and that the police just acted on his information.
Now let's just analysis that and see what information he gave the police.
If I could approach the bench, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. GAITHER: ...Let's look again at Exhibit 1. Now Mr. Guhr, he doesn't sign
it. You don't see his name on here. It says confidential on it, although he says he wanted people
to know he was giving this information. What does he do? He gives false information. We've
proven it false. I mean he even admitted it was false. When he got on the stand, let's look at one
of the good examples. If you go back, you recall he says, Well, yes, there was this lady who
brought her over some marijuana, about two pounds, brought her two pounds of marijuana...
He had no problem in writing this letter to the police to state that she also cultivated
approximately 250 to 300 seeds in plants, but when he's on the stand yesterday he didn't say
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anything about that He said there was a egg carton with a few plants that she was planting and
he wasn't sure that they were marijuana, could have been marijuana but he writes to the police.
This gives us false information. So when the police get the information they're getting
information that is false information. When they go out there they've got a mind set thinking that
there's this, Mr. Guhr has said all these things about Laura Miller...
When I cross examined him he just said it didn't happen. But he's willing to come
in and state under oath that this happened, this was a matter of fact and he writes it in this
letter.
What else does he say in the letter? Oh, these are the two men who supplied her
with marijuana all summer. He says, although he's saying there's cultivation going on, he's saying
that these two men are supplying her with marijuana in his letter...
He says he reports this on Sunday, September 19th, to a deputy and that nothing
happens and so now he's going to write a letter...
23.

Exhibit One, the letter referred to by Counsel for the Defendant, was never

submitted to the Jury because the Prosecutor took the received exhibit out of the Courtroom in
hisfile.(Tr.233).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Affiant submitted to the issuing judge an affidavit with false and incomplete

information which mischaracterized the source of information and the reliability of the Mr. Hans
Guhr, the person listed as the confidential informant, and that information was the basis for the
issuance of the warrant.
2.

The Affidavit on its face is insufficient under Utah law even without striking out

the information from the confidential informant to state probable cause.
10

3.

The Motion to Suppress should have been granted and the lower court should be

reversed and a judgement of suppression entered in favor of the Defendant and against the State
as requested by the Defendant-Appellant.
4.

During Closing Argument, the Defendant submitted that Exhibit One, the letter

from Hans Guhr set forth in the addendum, was a key because of the exaggerations and
misstatements made by the State's key witness.
5.

The Motion for Mistrial made by the Defendant should have been granted because

the prosecutor took out of the courtroom and kept in his file during deliberations Exhibit One.
6.

The Appellant submits that the Order denying the motion for mistrial should be

reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO STRIKE THE INFORMATION
FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT ROM THE AFFIDAVIT
SUBMITTED TO OBTAIN THE SEARCH WARRANT AND IN DENYING
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE

The Appellant presented to the trial court evidence that the affidavit and application for
the search warrant signed by Deputy William Pearce of the San Juan County Sheriffs Office
contained misrepresentations and omissions material to probable cause when submitted to the
issuing judge. The nature of the erroneous information required the lower court to enter a
finding that those errors were made either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.
The Appellant submits the Court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress because the information
should have been strickenfromthe applicationfromthe warrant.
In Franks vs. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154 (1978) the United States Supreme Court ruled that
a search warrant can be challenged based upon misstatements in the search warrant when
the misstatements are recklessly made or knowingly false information. That information must be
deleted under Franks in reviewing the sufficiency of the affidavit. If the statements are necessary
to a finding of probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and thefruitsthereof
suppressed from use at trial.
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In State vs. Brown. 798 P 2d 284 (Utah 1990) the Utah Courts followed the Franks
decision as to the procedure in relation to the knowing or reckless inclusion of information which
shows a disregard for the truth, including false and misleading information. The Court of Appeals
cited the case of Franks vs. Delaware, Supra, where the United States Supreme Court held that
if a Defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant made a false statement,
intentionally, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, the false material must be set
to one side and probable cause determined by the Affidavit's remaining content.
An affidavit supporting a search warrant which contains erroneous statements or
misstatements of material facts without sufficient independent accurate statements to support
issuance of a warrant should be suppressed. United States vs. Page. 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir
1980). In United States vs. Richardson. 861 F.2d 291 (US. APP D.C. 1988), the Court stated:
Police officers must take care to include all evidence of probable
cause available to them in their affidavit must accurately reflect
the facts of the particular case.
The test to determine whether any misrepresentation or false statement contained in an
affidavit is material to establishment of probable cause should be objectively determined as to
whether the warrant would have been issued if the magistrate had been given accurate
information. United States vs. Page. 808 F.2d 723, cert. den. 482 U.S. 918 (10th Cir. 1987). In
Page, the Tenth Circuit Court indicated non intentional errors material to the establishment of
probable cause also call for suppression if the errors are material.
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Under the "totality of the circumstances" standard, a magistrate issuing a warrant must
first make a practical, common sense decision as to whether there is a fair probability that
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Where the affidavit involves hearsay
conclusion of an expert, a magistrate would not have a "substantial basis for concluding]"
that probable cause existed if the expert conclusions were in error. Illinois vs. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983), citing Jones vs. United States. 362 US 257 (1960). The validity of a search warrant
must be assessed on the basis of information that the agents had actually disclosed or had a duty
to disclose to the issuing magistrate. Maryland vs. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
The Defendant submits that the affidavit submitted by the San Juan County Sheriffs
deputy contained admitted errors, such as the statement in the Affidavit that he had known Hans
Guhr "for two years." (See Exhibit 4 in Addendum). At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress,
the deputy indicated that he had actuallyfirstmet Hans Guhr in January 1993, only nine to 10
months prior to the issuance of the Affidavit. (Tr. pg 18). Mr. Guhr was not a reliable confidential
informant involved in prior investigations. Prior to the issuance of the Affidavit in this case,
Deputy Pierce indicated that Hans Guhr had never given him any prior information as a
confidential informant in relation to any investigation. The Appellant at the hearing demonstrated
that the deputy acted with at least reckless disregard for the truth and omitted and failed to submit
the known fact that the "confidential informant" was a prior resident with an ongoing feud with
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the other suspect. The deputy knew that Hans Guhr had lived at the residence when the plant was
growing and had an opportunity to plant and cultivate the marijuana.
The Utah Supreme Court has extended the reasoning in Franks to include misstatements
which occur because information is omitted. State vs. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). Under
Nielsen, a Defendant must establish by a preponderance of evidence that material information has
been intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly omitted and that with the omitted information
inserted, the Affidavit does not support probable cause. The Tenth Circuit Court has stated that
recklessness may be inferred where the omitted information is "clearly critical" to the
determination of probable cause. DeLoach vs. Bevers. 922 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1990).
The affiant should never have described Mr. Guhr as a confidential informant because he
had signed a letter to initiate the investigation and submitted the letter through the public mail. By
describing to Mr. Guhr as a confidential informant the affiant was able to characterize the
situation as a police initiated investigation instead of an inquiry started by afightbetween
caretakers of the property. This is clearly critical information which was not included in the
application to obtain the search warrant.
Further, at the trial when the Statefinallyproduced the "confidential informant" as a
witness, Mr. Guhr admitted that he was emotionally upset at Laura Miller when he turned her in
by means of the letter.(Tr. 113) Mr. Guhr took the pictures of the marijuana plants while he was
living on the property so that he could "protect himself1fromLaura Miller "bad mouthing me"
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(Tr. 128) He said that he released to photographs because Laura Miller made statements that
upset him to a third party. (Tr. 129)
The Deputy had met with Laura Miller prior to the execution of the affidavit and she
described the problems with Mr. Guhr which placed the Deputy on notice of Mr. Guhr's
motivation in writing the letter. The material information which was either in error or omitted
from the affidavit can be classified as follows:
1)

The fact of no prior use by the police of the "confidential

informant" of Mr. Guhr and that he was acting for private motives and not under
the supervision of law enforcement officials. (Tr.30)
2)

The fact that the affiant had not known Mr. Guhr for "two years"

and he did not have any substantial basis to personally vouch for his honesty
and truthfulness of the Canadian citizen in light of his knowledge of other
problems. (Tr.18)
3)

The fact that Mr. Guhr should have been a suspect of law

enforcement because the Deputy knew he had resided on the property during times
when the marijuana plant would have been maturing and acted as a caretaker at the
property. (Tr.37)
4)

The fact that Laura Miller, a suspect due to Mr. Guhr's letter (see

Exhibit one), had reported to the Deputy that Mr. Guhr was wrongfully in
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possession of a motor vehicle of the owner of the property and had a motive to
fabricate evidence because of problems between her and Mr. Guhr which caused
him to leave the property. (Tr.41).
5)

The lack of personal observation of the plant which was described

as being close to thefrontfence along the public road infrontof the property.
6)

The fact that Mr. Guhr did not have a social security number which

should have been disclosed during the prior employment of Mr. Guhr by the
Deputy Sheriff
7)

The report to the Deputy by the previous caretaker of the property,

Mary Ann Hutnick of improper and suspicious behavior of Hans Guhr and her
report that Mr. guhr was a "liar". (Tr.57).
If the omitted information had been inserted into the affidavit, no reasonable magistrate
"would have issued the search warrant based on the sketchy information provided by a person with
a motive to give false information. In light of the fact that the "confidential informant" was the
sole source of the information, evidence of the true nature and motivation of the source of the
information would discredit the information. The Appellant sustained the burden of presenting
evidence known to the Deputy which was disregarded in his brief investigation. The focus of the
investigation should have been on Mr. Guhr, instead of two or three telephone calls to the
"confidential informant. Therefore, the lower court should be reversed.
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POINT n
DOES THE WARRANT ON ITS FACE SUFFICIENTLY
CORROBORATE THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S TESTIMONY
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE WARRANT
UNDER BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION?
In State vs. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the requirements a warrant must
contain on it's face concerning independent verification of information from confidential
informant. The Court indicated the following the case of Illinois vs. Gates. 462 U.S., 213 (1983),
the warrant must establish a tight web of circumstantial evidence supporting the reliability of the
allegations of the confidential informant. The Court indicated that depending on the
circumstances, a showing of the basis of knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person
providing the information for a warrant may well be necessary to establish that, with a fair
probability, evidence sought actually exists and can be found where the informant claims.
In State vs. Lee, 863 P.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court applied the Court applied the
totality-of-the circumstance's analysis in analyzing probable cause under Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Sate Constitution. The affidavit in Lee was sufficient to establish probable cause because
the omitted information about the reliability of the informant was not material in light of
corroboration of the informant's statements by other information.
In State vs. Singleton. 214 Utah Ad. Rep 30 (1993) the Court of Appeals stated as
follows:
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Utah courts, however, have used the Aguilar-Spinelli factors as
guides in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test. "[A]n
informant's 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are but two
relevant considerations, among other, in determining the existence
of probable cause under 'a totality-of-the circumstances.'" Hansen,
732 P.2d at 130 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32,235-36, 103 S.
Ct. at 2328-31). See also State vs. Puruse. 828 P.2d 515-517.
(Utah App. 1992). The Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines are not applied
as "strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly exacted' in every
case. A weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so
long as in the totality there is substantial basis tofindprobable
cause." Hansen. 732 P.2d at 130 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238,
103 S. Ct. at 2332).
In an analysis of the Search Warrant used to obtain the search warrant by the San Juan
County Sheriffs Department indicates that the officer made misrepresentations concerning the
important factor of corroboration of the confidential informant as set forth in Point I of the Brief.
The evidence received at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress indicated that the affiant to the
search warrant failed to disclose relevant and important information concerning the unreliability of
the informant. Unlike the affidavit in State vs. Lee, supra, the statements of the informant were
not corroborated by any significant independent information.
The Appellant submits that the lower court shouldfindthat the affidavit is not sufficient
on it's face to support the issuance of a search warrant. Because the failure to support the
hearsay allegations of the confidential informant the affidavit fails, even if the allegations attacked
above in Point One of this brief are not strickenfromthe affidavit.
In State vs. Brown. 798 P 2d 284 (Utah 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals in relation to
search warrants issued on hearsay information noted that the Courts view the testimony of citizen
19

informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police informers, citing State vs.
Treadway, 499 P. 2d, 846 (Utah, 1972). The Court stated that in cases not involving citizen
informants that the two-pronged test of Aguilarvs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) which requires
circumstances which establish the basis of knowledge of the informant and the informant's
veracity or reliability should be considered in determining whether there is probable cause for the
Warrant.
The affidavit in support of the warrant does not contain the quantity or quality of
information necessary to support the hearsay assertionsfromthe unnamed source. The Affidavit
in this case consists of four brief paragraphs of relevant information. The information concerning
the confidential informant is a bald assertion that the confidential informant is a reliable and
truthful individual and states no factual basis for liability of the source or the information. Even if
the Court does not strike the information from the confidential informant, the Affidavit fails to
meet the requirements of State vs. Lee and State vs. Brown and requires that the Court should
have granted the Motion to Suppress.

POINT m
SHOULD THE COURT HAVE GRANTED THE MISTRIAL MOTION
BASED UPON THE PROSECUTORS POSSESSION DURING JURY
DELIBERATIONS OF A KEY EXHIBIT?
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After the arguments of Counsel, the Court instructed the jury as follows concerning the
exhibits and their deliberations.
THE COURT: Alright, members of the jury, go with the bailiff He will take you into the
jury room. He will bring the exhibits in later. I think the clerk will also be in to bring you a menu
so you can order lunch. Lunch is on the house.
Let's get that door shut. (Tr. 226)
The Court clearly intended to submit to the jury all of the exhibits and neither party nor
the court limited all of the exhibitsfrombeing submitted to the jury. Rule 17(k) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of
the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received as evidence, except
deposition; and each juror may also take with him any notes of the testimony or
other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any other person.
However, after the jury had returned and entered the verdict, the prosecutor brought to
the Court's attention the fact that he had taken an important State's Exhibit One out of the
Courtroom with him in his file and kept the exhibit during the deliberations.
The record reflects as follows:
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I have a matter that I need to indicate. As I made my closing
arguments I had this letter. It was placed on the desk. I put it in my stuff. It didn't go in the jury
room. It's Exhibit 1. I think that's what the motion, I just as the jury was coming in showed it to
Mr. Gaither. So I want the Court to know that's—
MR. GAITHER: Yes, Your Honor, at this time the Defendant would move the Court for
a mistrial. The prosecutor, he did show me before the jury came back in. In fact, he had, I'm sure
by inadvertence he had taken an exhibit that did not go into the jury which is Exhibit 1. I would
point out that that was a key exhibit to the defense. I referred to that exhibit specifically.
I asked the jury to read that exhibit. There was no other document that said that. As far as I was
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concerned in my closing argument, if my closing argument is reviewed that was the central
basis to the defense is that Hans Guhr had started out making false statements and that he was
suspect in the case and the information that he gave to the police was false and they did not have
it and this is an exhibit that was not in the jury room and I believe that there's no way that the
Court canfindthat that is not prejudicial. It's important to the defense. I understand it was
inadvertence on the part of the prosecutor. I'm not saying he took it intentionally but on the other
hand it's fundamental that all exhibits go into the jury and that they have all the exhibits before
them, that they consider all of the exhibits. So I would move the Court for a mistrial setting aside
the jury verdict.
THE COURT: Mr. Halls?
MR. HALLS: I appreciate Mr. Gaither's indication that he believe that that was
inadvertent which it was. Your Honor, I think if there's an issue here, if there is any difficulty here
it was not central to the jury's determination of what the verdict would have been whether they
had that or didn't have it. It was adequately argued by all parties. It was to the jury in a couple of
different ways by Mr. Gaither and parts of it by myself. If there is any error in that I believe it's
harmless error and if he wants to argue that to the Court of Appeals I believe that's the
appropriate for that to be done. I don't think that on that basis that the thing should be a mistrial.
THE COURT: Mr. Halls, when did you notice that you had that exhibit?
MR. HALLS: As I walked in here and sat down.
THE COURT: Why did neither one of you mention this to me before I asked for the jury
verdict. I could have sent that in with them and said you didn't have the exhibits. Here, here's an
additional exhibit. We won't take your verdict. You consider whether that affects your verdict
and then come back in. Why didn't either of you ask me to do that? This is something that
could easily have been corrected simply by sending the jury back out with that exhibit and there
would have been no question. I would not take their verdictfromthem until they had considered
whether that would make a difference.
MR. GAITHER: Again, in response, this gets to the basis of a jury trial. They are
supposed to have all of the exhibits and all of the evidence and, again, this was key. This was the
document that I said you need to take a look at. Please read and deliberate on this. And it wasn't
in there before the jury. So they did not have all of the exhibits and I think that we would move
the Court for a mistrial.
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THE COURT: All right. Ifindthat the Defendant has not raised this in timely fashion.
She knew about it, admittedly shortly before the verdict was received but she knew about it in
time that this could have been raised in time to correct it by sending the jury back before the
verdict was received.
MR. GAITHER: This was done as the jury was walking in and—
MR. HALLS: No, it was done before the bailiff went out. Your Honor, I walked in and
sat down here. I opened up my file and there was the document and I pulled it out and I said,
"Oops." He shook his head and said, Oh. And it was before the Judge came in. In fact, it was
before you walked in the room.
MR. GAITHER: I don't believe that the Defendant or myself has an obligation to, this
isn't a mistake that, I mean I didn't have the exhibit. Mr. Halls knew he had the exhibit. As the
Court has indicated he could have said something to the Court. He didn't say anything to the
Court. As far as I'm concerned it was a mistrial at the time it went in there at the time of
deliberation. It would have been error, after they have reached a verdict to send that back in. I
was representing my client to the best of my abilities. I did not know of any requirement that
said that I had to point out the fact that the prosecutor has an exhibit there to the Court. My
client should not be held, I don't think that the Court canfinda waiver in this situation based on
those facts and circumstances.
THE COURT: I dofindthat the Defendant was aware but before the jury was brought
into the courtroom and certainly before the Court received the verdict and had it read. Certainly
not before the jury had indicated that they had reached a decision. But I can send them back
before they have announced the decision and any fact, even afterwards I can send them back
saying, wait a minute, I think there is something here that is a problem. I think I could send them
back even then to reconsider their verdict in the light of additional information.
And even if that were not the case, it's my judgment that having listened to the evidence
during the trial and the arguments of the parties that the contents of Exhibit 1 were adequately
and repeatedly described to the jury and that there was really no dispute about what Exhibit 1
said. And therefore, I certainly would have preferred to have the jury have it there in the event
they wanted to look at it but they did not ask where it was which indicated they did not, at least I
think it's reasonable to believe that they did not consider it a disputed question what Exhibit 1
said. It was something that had admittedly been argued, certainly been argued by the defendant
extensively but that meant that the jury was very much aware of that exhibit and so I don't find
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that there is prejudice to the Defendant in the fact that Exhibit 1 was not given to the jury to
review. So the motion for mistrial is denied. (Tr. 236 to 238)
In State vs. Buckley, 546 A.2d 799 (VT. 1988) a defendant convicted after a jury trial
argued that the Court erred in failing to supply to the jury during the jury's deliberation an exhibit
which had been introduced into evidence. The Court in Vermont indicated that by oversight one
of the exhibits had not been avaiabile to the jury and it was not clearfromthe record whether the
omission was the fault of the Court or of counsel. Noting that in the usual course of events, the
exhibits would have gone to the jury absent a ruling to the contrary, the Court found that there
was no reason to believe that the exhibit would have been withheld from the jury. The Court
affirmed the conviction because it had not been demonstrated that the Defendant was in anyway
prejudice by the absence of the exhibit in the jury room during the jury's deliberations.
Counsel for Laura Miller immediately indicated to the Court that the exhibit taken from
the courtroom by the Prosecutor was a key exhibit for the defense. The prosecution was at fault
and the reasons the jury did not received the Exhibit as set forth above in the Statement of Facts
to this brief, is the relevant portion of the Defendant's closing argument in which Exhibit One was
referred to as a key exhibit which should be read by the jury because it contained statement which
were inconsistence to the statements of Mr. Guhr and other persons during trial. The jury never
was able to review the outrageously inconsistent statements of Mr. Guhr in the letter.
The Prosecutor was the party that took the exhibits out of the courtroom and it was the
cause of the exhibit not being avaiabile for the jury during deliberations. The Defendant submits
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that the Court should have granted the Motion for Mistrial which was timely made by the
Defendant. The Defendant has shown that the exhibit was an important material exhibit and its
absence prejudiced the Defendant and denied her the right to a fair trial.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The Defendant respectfully submits that the District Court erred in failing to suppress all
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant and the fruit of that illegal search. Even if the evidence
from the warrant obtained form the unreliable confidential informant is not excised, the search
warrant cannot support afindingof probable cause because the myriad of material
misrepresentation recklessly included in the warrant and the numerous errors and omissions.
A new trial should be ordered if the Court reverses the denial of the Motion to Suppress.
In addition, the Defendant has raised in Point HI grounds for a new trial based upon the taking of
an exhibitfromthe courtroom during deliberations by the prosecutor. This is separate ground
which the Defendant requests that the Court reverse the conviction and order an new trial.
DATED this

day of September, 1994.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed First Class Mail,
postage prepaid to:
JAN GRAHAM,
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

DATED this

day of September, 1994.
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CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P. 0. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587-2128

SEVENTH O'CT^'.yr CDUrtf
San Juan Crcnty

FILED

O C T -•': '033

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CLERK O* THE COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UfAB
c70™
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

*
*

INFORMATION

vs.
LAURA RUTH MILLER,
*
DOB: 3-5-61,
PO. BOX 96, LA SAL, UT. 84530
Defendant.
*

Criminal No. 9317-;?7J

•Officer: WILLIAM PIERCE, BILL KING,
The undersigned Complainant, CRAIG C. HALLS, under oath
states on information and belief that the Defendant(s) committed in
the above named County, the Crime(s) of:
COUNT No. 1:
UNLAWFULLY PRODUCING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE:
A
Felony of the 3rd degree, in violation of Section
58-37-8 (1) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended in the manner as follows: That the said
defendant on or about the 1ST day of OCTOBER, 1993,
did knowingly and intentionally produce a controlled
substance, to wit: MARIJUANA
COUNT No. 2:
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE: A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR,
in violation of Section 58-378(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in
the manner as follows: That the said defendant on
or about the 1ST day of OCTROBER, 1993, did
knowingly and intentionally have in her possession a
controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana.

COUNT No. 3:
POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA: A Class B Misdemeanor,
in violation of Section 58-37a-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended in the manner as follows:
That the said defendant on or about the 1st day of
OCTOBER,
1993, did have in her possession
paraphernalia used to plant, propagate, cultivate,
grow, manufacture, produce, process, prepare, store,
inhale, ingest, or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body.

Contrary to the form of the Statute in such case made and
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.

g C. Halls
Juan County Attorney
DATED: October 4, 1993

."SEVENTH DISTRICT COUP-

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P. 0. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587-2128

w

HM: 0 9 Tti
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY
Cyputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

*
*

FINDING OF FACT
AND ORDER

*

Criminal No. 9317-273

vs.
LAURA MILLER,
Defendant(s).

*

This matter came on before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress on the

4th day of February, 1994. Defendant was present

and represented by counsel, Randall Gaither. The State was present
and represented by Craig C. Halls.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court finds that the search was conducted pursuant to
a warrant and that the Defendant has the burden of going forward
and showing that the warrant was deficient.
2.

Having heard all of the witnesses in this case the Court

finds that the information given to the Officer in this case was:
a.

That the confidential informant lived at the

residence immediately before the information was given.
b.

That the Officer had in his possession pictures of

what he believed to be Marijuana plants described as being
1

located on the property.
c. That the informant had been a caretaker of this
property and was allowed to remain on the properties even
after difficulties had arisen with other persons who had
lived or been trusted there.
d. That the description of the premises given
by the informant was borne out through

independent

investigation by the Officer.
e.

That the Officer viewed the properties at the

location where the informant had said the plants were
being cultivated from a public access and verified that
the description was similar to what had been expressed to
him earlier.
3.

The Court finds that the seeming inconsistency in the

search warrant with regard to the amount of time that the Officer
had known the confidential informant was apparently in error based
upon the testimonyf but that this error was not reckless and was
not material and did not change the sufficiency in the warrant.
4.

The Court finds that no other part of the warrant was

reckless and that information with regard to the confidential
informant relationship to the people on the property and possible
motive was not borne out by the evidence and was not of a
substantial enough nature to change the sufficiency of the warrant
and was not required to be expressed in the warrant to make the
warrant sufficient.
5.

The Court finds that after these supposed incidents
2

occurred which bias the confidential informant, that the owner of
the property retained him as a care taker of the property.
6.

The Court further finds upon hearing the testimony of the

owner of the property and the defendant that their testimony was
not as reliable as evidence placed into the record by the Officer.
7.

The Court finds that warrant was sufficient, that the

information express in the warrant provided probable cause to
believe that marijuana plants may have been cultivated on the
property at the time in question.

That this was sufficiently set

forth by the warrant and that the warrant was sufficient.
IT IS THEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

^TK

day of March, 1994.

Judcje Lyle R. Anderson
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Randall Gaither, at
321 South 600 E., S.L.C. Ut. 84102 this £\J* day of March, 1994,
by placing same postage prepaid in the Monticello Post Office.
~~I/
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IN THE JUSTICE COURT

'-j/l'-

IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of SAN JUAN

)

:

ss

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE;

Justice Court Judge Muhlestein, Monticello, Utah

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
William Pierce
That he has reason to believe that on the premises of :
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on
the following described pxoperty. (Copy of Warranty Deed also
attached.)
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16f W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg.
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running
thence S 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. 53* W 208.71 ft,
thence N 0 deg. 16f W 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53f E 208.71 ft
to the pob.
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 161 -W and 626.13 ft. S. 86
deg 53' W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M., and
running thence S. 0 deg 16' W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53' E.
208.71 ft. to the pob.
Commonly known as the Steven Robert Schultz property.
and/or

in the vehicle(s) described as:

Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates,
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV
In the San Juan County, State of Utah there is now certain property
or evidence described as:
Cultivation of Marijuana and other controlled substances.
and that said property or evidence which consists of an item or
constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct;
1

(>i

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of Cultivation of Marijuana and possession
of controlled substances.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant
are:
Information obtained from confidential informant indicates that the
property described is being used to cultivate,, marijuana> The
confidential informant also indicates that marijuana ancT other
controlled substances are kept in the vehicles and buildings on the
property.
Confidential informant states that he has observed
controlled substances in possession of one Laura Miller over the
last few months, in her possession, in the structures (there are
out buildings, a house and mobile home on the property), and in the
vehicles she has access to on the property.
Confidential informant indicated he had viewed the use of marijuana
and "crack" on the property over the last few months by Miller and
two unknown males from Moab, Ut.
Your affiant considers the information
confidential informant reliable because;

received

from

the

Confidential informant is known to the requesting officer for two
years and has known to be a reliable and truthful individual.
Your affiant has verified the above information from the
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the
following independent investigation:
The confidential informant indicated specific location on the
property were the marijuana is being cultivated. He described the
position relative to the building and trees.
He provided
photographs of the live marijuana plants. Through plain view of
the property from a public access road the location can be seen and
his description verified. Although only the tall grass can be seen
as described and seen in the provided photographs.

WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered, or for other good reasons, to wit: can be
easily destroyed
2
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AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 1st day of October, 1993.

JUDGE

I'

IN THE JUSTICE COURT,
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
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